The messianic reformers of the Soviet transition, whether Western or Russian, considered the socialist economy so moribund, so inefficient and so obsolete that it was an article of faith that markets could only bring economic improvement. But conditions have only got worse, much worse. Over the last 10 years Russia's Gross Domestic Product has fallen by more than half; living standards for most have plummeted along with increased material insecurity; and the population continues to shrink with falling life expectancy. A decade of market reform has been a decade of unprecedented economic decline.
economy just as there is no singular and inevitable end point to economic reform.
These are important lessons to draw from Polanyi but I propose to adopt his broader historical vision that encompasses one and a half centuries from the end of the 18 th . century to the middle of the 20 th . century -a history of the dynamic processes that lead first to the expansion of and then to the reaction against the market. This double movement I argue has been telescoped into 10 years in Russia, although its form and effects have been profoundly different because it has occurred at such a different tempo and in such a different context. To make the case that Polanyi's account of England is relevant to Russia today, I divide the historical account of England's Great Transformation into phases which parallel Russia's Great Involution.
First, Polanyi devotes almost a third of his book to the genesis of the market and the breakdown of the Speenhamland welfare system in which livelihood of the indigent was supplemented with cash payments according to the price of bread. As an obstacle to a national labor market, Speenhamland was, in Polanyi's view, a form of "reactionary paternalism" which demoralized and degraded laborers while stifling entrepreneurial energies of employers. As Maurice Glasman (1994 Glasman ( , 1996 has argued, Polanyi's hostility to the "totalitarian" Speenhamland conjures up the liberal wrath against communism --its despotism, its paternalism, its stifling of freedom. There are limits to the analogy --Speenhamland was not a comprehensive "planned economy" but the last bulwark against the market society. Nonetheless the invective Polanyi deploys against Speenhamland's stifling administrative order makes the parallel with communism worth pursuing.
The second phase began when Speenhamland was finally rescinded with the New Poor Law Act of 1834 which abolished outdoor poor relief. The last obstacle to the selfregulating market was vanquished and the working class was left to fend for itself against the ravishes of the market society. The equivalent break through to the market is played out in Russia with the "great liberal reforms" of 1992, freeing of prices, opening the economy to market forces, voucher privatization of state enterprises, all of which threw the population into turmoil and back onto its private resources. As in England, in the face of economic devastation, Russia's neoliberal utopians trumpeted the supernatural, redemptive powers of the market, what Polanyi calls the "liberal creed."
Polanyi's third phase is the reaction to the self-regulating market. Here lies his most original contribution: society's movement against the commodification of land, labor and money that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. Russia presents its own distinctive response to the commodification of these three pillars of social and economic life which, as we shall see, was less an active regulation and more a self-protective retreat.
Finally, in Polanyi's fourth phase the reaction against the self-regulating market assumed international proportions in the 1930s, when countries abandoned the gold standard, undermined the international balance of power, and adopted statist solutions to economic problems --communism's collectivization and planning, fascism, social democracy, and the New Deal. We will have to consider whether Russia today might be moving toward a similar protectionism and restoration of statism or alternatively, as I will propose, we are witnessing the appearance of a form of neo-feudalism. Table 1 summarizes the two accounts of market transition.
Taking Polanyi's account of England as our analytical template compels us to recognize discrete phases and dynamic processes in the postcommunist market transition.
It also gives us a template with which to make comparisons among countries, facing the transition from socialism. In order to avoid yet another deficit reading of Russia, however, we need to uncover the unstated assumptions of The Great Transformation, assumptions that make England's transition historically specific, and thereby provide the grounds for alternative assumptions that fit the Russian case.
Problematizing the Great Transformation
To what historical event or complex of events does the "Great Transformation"
refer? In the conventional reading "The Great Transformation" refers to the rise of the Gustafson's (1999) account of Russian capitalism juxtaposes market transition on the one side and collapse, legacy and take-over by oligarchy on the other as competing forces whose relative strengths will determine Russia's fate. He talks of Russia's as yet indeterminate revolution. An involutionary framework argues that Russia's market transition has produced economic, social and political degeneration.
4 In Polanyi's account the working class spontaneously rises up against the degrading effects of the market as soon as Speenhamland is dissolved. The Poor Law Reform Act marked the birth of the working class. The historical record shows, however, that the working class appeared in the North of England where there was no legacy of Speenhamland and in the South where Speenhamland did exist there was no working class (Block and Somers, 1999: Somers, 1993 In other words, contemporary Russia is remarkable not for the rise and fall of the market but for the absence of these three alternative significations of the nineteenth century great transformation --the transformation of production, of society and of the state. The economy undergoes neither a neoliberal revolution nor an institutional evolution but rather an economic involution, a market that sucks resources out of production, sending it into a spiraling contraction. Instead of a vibrant synergy between civil society and the state we find their mutual repulsion in which society turns in on itself -societal involution --and the federal state turns outwards to the global economy, unable to contain the tendency toward regional autonomy -political involution. We need to ask, therefore, why a "great involution" rather than a second great transformation?
Economic Involution: The Expansion of the Market
Although Polanyi intends his work to be a radical critique of the liberal creed, of market dogmatism, in one respect he recapitulates that account, namely in divorcing the genesis of the market, the breakdown of barriers to the free exchange of the factors of production, from the subsequent dynamics of the market economy. Once the corrosive welfare system of Speenhamland, the last dam holding back the on-rushing market society, is defeated its traces cannot be discovered in the new order. Once the selfregulating economy is established, its logic preempts any legacies from the past, obliterates vestiges of its genesis. According to Polanyi, therefore, the magic and indeed devastation of the market will work itself out irrespective of origins, irrespective of the particular path to the market economy. This too was the anticipation of Russia's neoliberal reformers (and their Western advisors). They assumed that the market logic would sweep the calumniated communism into the dustbin of history. A thick line could be drawn between the past and the present, opening up a future with all capitalism's self-regulating society. He lays the blame at the doorstep of the market utopian reaction to communismthe market experiment corroded society.
blessings. Instead it turned out that Russia's market economy was infused with, one might say even dominated by its past.
When Speenhamland was struck down, and the New Poor Law introduced in 1834 bringing about a national market in labor, England had been developing a market economy for centuries. In Russia's case the programmatic introduction of the market economy took place overnight and in the rush features of the old order were consolidated rather than obliterated.
In order to understand the way the past has taken revenge on the new order, we need to first characterize the old order. It was an administered economy in which goods and services were centrally appropriated and then redistributed. This established a bargaining relation between the administrative center and enterprise production, conducted on the terrain of planning targets and indices. For our purposes three features of this order are important.
--First, the system of planning gave the economy a monopolistic character as targets were assigned to specific enterprises and duplication was regarded as wasteful.
Within each region industries were organized into conglomerates which organized each sector. Enterprises for their part sought to increase their power with their supervisory centers through expansion and further monopolization of the production of goods and services.
--Second, in the absence of hard budget constraints, the compulsion to expand led to an insatiable appetite for expansion at all costs which deepened monopolistic tendencies but also generated a shortage economy. Enterprises faced constraints from the side of supply, which led them to incorporate the production of inputs into their organization or circumvent the command economy by entering into informal relations with their suppliers. The semi-legal system of lateral barter relations was organized by regional party officials and by a class of intermediaries or pushers known as tolkachi.
--Third, the administered economy enhanced worker control over production for two reasons. First full employment gave workers leverage because they, like everything else, were in shortage. It was difficult and counterproductive for managers to get rid of workers. This gave workers the power to resist managerial encroachments on their autonomy. But second, that autonomy was also necessary because the shortage economy required flexible adaptation to unreliable machinery and unpredictable material flows.
The result was a compromise in which workers sought to realize the plan so long as managers provided the conditions for its fulfillment and a minimal standard of living.
When the party state disintegrated in the period of late perestroika and the center no longer commanded, the preexisting monopolies were not weakened but strengthened.
No longer subject to control either from party or ministries, their monopolistic tendencies were unfettered. Local conglomerates begin to act like enormous trading companies with a monopoly over specific resources and products. At the same time the breakdown of the redistributive economy led to an increase in lateral exchanges which, in the absence of cash flows and effective banking system, initially took the form of barter. Finally, with the collapse of the party, workers assumed even greater control over production, especially as managers were absorbed in organizing barter transactions --for themselves as well as the enterprise.
One can regard the new order as the deepening of distinctive features of the old one or alternatively as the emergence of a new order of merchant capital. With the disintegration of the administered economy, each unit seeks to maximize profit but not through investing in or regulating production but through exploiting its monopoly position within a system of trade. Directors use their inherited ties to government organs to protect their subsidies, credits, export licenses and at the same time stifle independent capital accumulation. Workers control production and so managers seek compromises with workers that give them a cut in the proceeds of barter operations but surplus is not used to reinvest in or transform production. Indeed, productive activity is parallel to a putting out system in which managers organize the supply of materials and the exchange of products while workers are paid for what they deliver. Preexisting monopolies and effective worker control of production combine to lead Russia down the road to merchant capitalism and economic involution.
The disintegration of the party state was the terrain onto which reforms were introduced. Price liberalization comes first at the beginning of 1992, fuelling inflation and further lubricating the appetite for profits from trade. Instead of begging for resources, enterprises now pleaded for financial credits. The old system of plan bargaining was made easier and soft budget constraints were merely monetized. Independent banks mushroomed and flourished as the conduit of government credits on the one side and as the conversion of enterprise assets into managerial profiteering on the other. Interenterprise arrears and non-payment of wages spiraled out of control as bills were left outstanding. Voucher privatization in the summer of 1992 turned enterprise assets over to de facto managerial control while workers were left hanging onto the leaky bag of production.
In other words, every reform took Russia further down the path of merchant capital, making more difficult the transition to a "bourgeois capitalism" based on accumulation and self-transformation. This was a dynamic economy but dynamic in the sphere of exchange -a dynamics that came at the cost of production. The market opened up trade, barter, banking and at the same time gave new meaning and place to a "mafia" -a shadow state that enforced transactions in the absence of an effective state. Productive activity shrunk, inter-enterprise arrears expanded even further and wages were not paid or only paid in kind. This was a "pre-bourgeois" pursuit of profit, what Weber called speculative, adventure, booty capitalism, a form of mercantilism, and not his "rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labor" that motored dynamic accumulation.
Instead it impelled economic involution in which exchange leaches production without offering means of resuscitation.
The Russian "Great Transformation" never happened. The neoliberal reformers waited every year for signs of market revivalism, for the start of the market revolution.
The reforms were radical but skin deep. From the beginning they were plagued with unanticipated consequences because they only peeled off the outer layer of the Soviet order, revealing a resilient substratum that resisted the reorganization of the economy and its institutions. The evolutionary economists diagnosed the errors of shock therapy but they did not have the conceptual tools to understand Russia's actual abortive trajectory:
economic involution followed by societal involution.
Societal and Political Involution: The Retreat from the Market
The advance of the market into the Russian hinterland along the tributaries of the Soviet economy set in its train a reaction to the market. Economic involution gave rise to societal and political involution. To explore the contrast with Polanyi's societal and political transformation we draw on his most original insight, namely the analysis of fictitious commodities. When labor, land and money are subject to open purchase and sale, Polanyi argues that they lose their essential nature. When it is hired and fired at will labor is dehumanized; when land is commodified the environment is destroyed, and agriculture becomes precarious; when money is the object of speculation the survival of business is threatened.
The self-regulating market, therefore, destroys the social order upon which it rests. Polanyi shows, therefore, how in England the commodification of land, labor and money comes to be hedged with restriction and protection. Labor organizes itself into trade unions, cooperatives, the factory movement for the restriction of the length of the working day and the abolition of child labor, the Chartist Movement for the extension of political rights to the working people. Society emerges to protect labor from the extremes of immiseration, degradation, and subjugation. The commercialization of land threatened to shatter the agrarian community but it was the landed gentry, in their position as ruling class, who tamed the market with land laws and tariffs. Finally, a national monetary system with its central bank guaranteed stability in the value of money, controlling inflation as well as exchange rates, creating that certainty in the environment without which businesses flounders. In Polanyi's scheme the state protects the fictitious commodities by negotiating the compromise between market and society.
Facing the commodification of labor, land and money, Russia in the 1990s arrives at a fundamentally different solution. Whereas in England the market spawned, in reaction, a vibrant society that was aided and abetted by a regulatory state, in Russia society took a headlong retreat from the market to more primitive economic forms. By the same token the state, rather than forging a synergic alliance with society, hooked itself into the global economy, and became enmeshed in the organization of transnational flows of natural resources, finance and information. At the same time it became detached from the local economy, raiding it for immediate riches without concern for its reproduction, let alone expansion. What does involution mean in the case of each of our fictitious commodities? We will deal in turn with labor, land and money.
The Decommodification of Labor and the Turn to Subsistence and Petty
Commodity Production. Labor has been decommodified by not being paid a cash wage.
Workers still go to work because there they find all sorts of non-monetary resources.
They can use enterprise equipment and materials to work for themselves or directly for others on a contract basis. Work is a place where information about economic opportunities circulates, where workers can pick up unofficial "work on the side" or "second jobs." Just as managers began to strip enterprises of their assets so workers intensified their own petty stealing. Finally, without a job workers are denied benefits from the state -supplementary benefits for low income families, child allowances, and in the future unemployment compensation and various pensions.
While the enterprise acts as an informal welfare order, working class families increasingly produce the means of their livelihood outside work. Most notoriously there are the dachas with adjoining plots of land where some half of Russian families spend their weekends and holidays, looking after children and cultivating crops. Even without dachas, families grow basic food, especially potatoes, on allotments that are usually not too far from their homes. Self-maintenance extends beyond subsistence agriculture to include making clothes or furniture, home repair, and much sharing of scarce commodities such as books and toys. In short decommodifying labor does not take the form of hedging the labor market with protection but retreating from the labor market into more primitive self-maintaining communities.
The Decommodification of Land and the Repeasantization of Agriculture.
In the area of agriculture we observe similar processes (Kitching, 1998a (Kitching, , 1998b . Despite pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the Duma has so far refused to privatize land.
Members of collective farms can sell their share of the land but only to other members of the same collective and not to outsiders. The collective farm itself has not disappeared but like the industrial enterprise its function has changed. It too acts like a welfare order of last resort, but its economic function has turned from a center of agricultural production increasingly to a service center for the independent agriculture of its members. As the collective farm has little money to pay wages so members spend more time on their own plots of land. The collective farm becomes a service center that loans According to most estimates around 70% of economic transactions between enterprises are conducted through barter. 6 Market prices provide the baseline for the terms of exchange with a supplement depending on the fungibility of the commodity being exchanged. Thus is if oil is bartered for apartments then the exchange rate will favor oil, just as bricks will be favored over timber. To facilitate these chains all sorts of pseudo currencies emerge. Thus large enterprises that produce basic commodities, such as oil or steel companies, or the regional Ministry of Finance issue their own "IOU's," known as vekselia, which are traded at discounted prices. Often the originating company will not recognize the nominal value of their own vekselia. Regional taxes are often paid in kind so that the government recreates its own clearing house, a center for the redistribution of resources, what one might call a return to a rudimentary and hidden planning system.
7 By far the best and most detailed account of the double movement in the sphere of exchange is to be found in Woodruff (1999) . In the first reform phase, the monetization takes off, while in the second phase bankruptcy is avoided through exiting the national ruble economy by engaging in barter and creating surrogate monies, promoted by the local state. In a third phase, the central authorities are also drawn in to supporting regional barter economies.
Barter is not an enduring legacy of the Soviet planning since the latter was dissolved and in 1992-1993, the economy was monetized. It was only later with stabilization and the effective bankruptcy of most enterprises that barter returned as a means of survival outside the monetary sphere. As David Woodruff (1999) In Russia the transition is in the opposite direction. Under the Soviet order the working class was a central player in the political economy not just in ideology but also in practice. For, as I've already outlined, under the shortage economy of state socialism workers were especially powerful because of the control they necessarily exercised over production. It was essential, therefore, for the party state to not only justify and maintain its domination but also elicit the active consent of its working class, thereby giving the latter considerable leverage. The proletariat's prominence in ideology, therefore, was not merely a cynical ploy but had a material basis. With the disintegration of the administered economy and the transition from a nomenclatura to a financial-merchant bourgeoisie, centered on banks, trading, mafia, and exploitation of natural resources, industry collapsed and the working class became a superfluous residue of the past.
The "liberal creed" of the New Russians, on the other hand, far from being a "hegemonic" ideology that wins the active consent of the mass of the population, became a thin veil of justification and legitimation for pursuing narrow economic interests.
Perhaps in the beginning consumerism had a mass appeal but as expectations were dashed and labor grew poorer it generated hostility, opposition or cynicism combined with a nostalgia for the radiant past. The emptying out of production and the retreat of the state destroyed the ground from underneath the working class, so that it no longer possessed the collective will to organize effective opposition. Apart from occasional local outbreaks, only the coal miners were able to mount nation wide strikes, demanding were, driving a wedge between Russia's global city, Moscow, and its retarding hinterland. Russia is polarized between two worlds, the hypermodern world of currency exchange and international commodity flows and the premodern world of barter, trade, petty commodity production, and peasant subsistence (Castells and Kiselyova, 1998) .
As the center is integrating into the most advanced circuits of the global information society, the hinterland is hurtling in the other direction toward a neofeudalism. The parcellized sovereignty of feudalism is recapitulated in Russia's regional suzerainties. Their local economies are organized through extra-economic force, the racketeering mafias, connected to the local patrimonial state. On the ground, the working classes turn increasingly to subsistence production, small scale trade, and familial exchange while relying on a cash economy for basic goods that they cannot produce.
Their unpaid "wage-labor" becomes a rent for minimal social protection, health care, child care, disability and old age pensions, unemployment compensation, wage supplements, housing subsidies and child support. Society is primordial and gelatinous, increasingly cut off from the sturm and drang of Moscow politics.
Russia in Comparative Perspective
In trying to make sense of Russia's experience since 1991 I have taken the broadest comparative canvas. I have drawn on Karl Polanyi's account of the fall of reactionary paternalism in 19 th . century England, its replacement by a market society, followed by statist reaction that countered the unregulated market. In broad sweep we can say that this century long transition and reaction was telescoped into a decade of Russian
history. But what he took for granted, namely economic, social and political transformation, has proved to be an elusive outcome for those entering the world market today.
In Russia, the consequences of the market transition have been especially destructive. Did the Russian transition have to be the way it was? Was Russia destined to take its own road to economic and societal involution? It is all too easy to say that it was inevitable because Russia's history shows it to be inimical to capitalist development.
Here comparative analysis suggests alternative explanations. Comparing the trajectories of Russia with Central European countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, suggests that both antecedent conditions and alternative strategies of transition are important.
First, let us consider antecedent conditions. The market economy had advanced much further in these countries, especially Hungary and Poland, than in Russia. Indeed the physical planning that dominated the Soviet economy had been left behind in the 1970s with the rise of fiscal planning, the marketization of trade and retail and greater autonomy for agriculture. When the party state disintegrated in Hungary and Poland it revealed a flourishing entrepreneurial economy, whereas in Russia it augmented the power of the large monopolistic conglomerates which continued to dominate the economy.
Second, we observe alternative strategies of transition. Precisely because Russia was so backward with respect to the development of a market economy, it tried to catch up overnight with radical and dramatic plans, beginning with Shatalin's famous 500 day transition to capitalism. But the very speed of the attempted transition had the effect of breaking up the administrative system and reconcentrating power in the hands of the conglomerates. While the Czech government talked up the virtues of the market and the importance of radical transformation in practice it took a slow and evolutionary road, with protective trade policies, controlled liberalization of prices and a gradual privatization scheme. Hungary had always taken an evolutionary road. In Poland the Solidarity government's attempt at shock therapy had mixed results until the Social Democrats were returned to office and introduced more state centered, evolutionary policies.
The contrast with China is perhaps the most remarkable. Since 1990 the Chinese economy has expanded at the rate the Russian economy collapsed. The state has nurtured the development of an expanding private sector while seeking to enforce harder budget constraints on its state monopolies (Oi, 1998; Walder, 1994; Naughton, 1995; Rawski, 1994 Polanyi took for granted. Russia lost this opportunity because it fell victim to a programmatic destruction of the state administered economy, as if destruction itself were sufficient for genesis. China took the reformist road to transition and created a transformation, while Russia took the revolutionary road and produced involution.
